“We have a problem with the integration of Muslims which raises the issue of Islam in Europe. To say it is not a problem is to hide from reality. If you let 100 million Turkish Muslims come in, what will come of it?”

In asking this question, French President Nicholas Sarkozy is not alone. His predecessor, and one of the men who drafted the European Constitution, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was blunter when in 2002 he stated flatly; “In my opinion, Turkish membership would be the end of Europe." Indeed, it is no secret that many European Union member states have great reservations about Turkey becoming a fully paid-up member of the EU. Given that only three per cent of its land mass is technically located within Europe, and with an at least nominally Muslim population of 99.8 per cent, many within the EU fear that a "clash of civilisations" makes Turkish membership an unpalatable prospect.

Historically, Turkey and Europe have hardly been good bedfellows. Aggression between Turkey’s predecessor – the Ottoman Empire – and European rivals dates back as early as the eleventh century. It was not until the collapse of the Ottoman regime following its defeat in WWI that Turkey, using Europe as a model, started to pursue a rigorous programme of modernisation and, most importantly, secularisation throughout the 1920s and 1930s under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal "Atatürk." What emerged was a secular state with a Muslim majority, as opposed to a Muslim state, that embraced many of the "Western values" that today make it a serious candidate for fully-fledged membership of the European Union.

One of the most consistently dependable allies of the West against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, Turkey first applied for Associate Membership of the new European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1959, which was finally accepted under the Ankara Agreement four years later. The Ankara Agreement envisaged "closer economic ties" between Turkey and the Community, with the ultimate aim being full membership.

However, old tensions between Turkey and Europe had by no means been eradicated, even in the climate of the Cold War. 1974 saw a back-sliding of Turko-European relations with the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern third of Cyprus following years of tensions between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. This culminated in a Greek-Cypriot coup in July of that year that overthrew the president, Makarios III, and saw the proclamation of a union of the island with mainland Greece under the notorious Enosis Plan.

Though the Turkish invasion prevented this, the newly formed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was declared illegal and was left internationally isolated. Despite repeated efforts on the part of both the United Nations and the European Union to re-unify the island, most famously perhaps the Annan Plan of 2004, Cyprus remains divided and is, without question, the biggest single hindrance to Turkish membership of the European Union. This is particularly so following the controversial accession of the southern Republic of Cyprus to the EU as one of the ten new member-states in 2004 after the Greek Cypriot rejected the Annan Plan. The Republic of Cyprus, like all other members of the EU, now has a veto over any question of the admission of a new member-state, and Turkey is faced with the awkward problem of not fully recognising the side it is negotiating with.

However, the Turkish application faces other problems too. Amongst them are European reservations about the continuing influence of the army in the political arena. The self-proclaimed guardians of Kemalist secularism, the generals have intervened on several occasions since 1945, most recently ten years ago with the so-called post-modern coup that led to the ousting of a government seen to be acting in contravention of this character.

Since then the threat of force has been as effective as force itself, and this year there have been none-too-subtle rumblings in the barracks both preceding and following the election of former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to the presidency on 28 August. Widely seen as an Islamic conservative, his insistence that his wife wears Islamic headdress, banned in Turkish public buildings, has only added to these concerns. Yet herein lie two interesting paradoxes.

The first arises because that to which Europe objects – the strong arm of the military in politics – declares itself necessary in order to prevent any back-tracking on the part of the Turkish political establishment towards the creation of an Islamist state. Thus the initial problem of military meddling in matters political is one about which the European establishment can object. But the bitter irony is that the realisation of the latter concern – an avowedly Islamist Turkey – would be worse still for Europe, making too hard a push for the ejection of the army from the political stage potentially dangerous. The second paradox perhaps eases to an extent the first insofar as it is the incumbent conservative Islamic Justice and Development (AK) Party, of which Mr Gül is a member, that has arguably done more than any of its more secular predecessors to bring Turkey along the road to full integration within the European Union. 2001-2002 saw the introduction of a raft of major political and human rights based reforms by the government, including the abolition of the death penalty, in an attempt to bring Turkey into line with the EU’s Copenhagen accession criteria.

Yet this is a party that provoked nearly a million secularist Turks to rally in Istanbul twice in one April fortnight this year, chanting “no to sharia,” and protesting, amongst other things, plans by the Party to create alcohol-free zones in Turkey and recent bids to outlaw adultery. This is a party that also counts the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan as a member, a man jailed for four months in his youth for reading a poem which included the lines “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers.” Yet it is also clearly a party committed to European integration, which begs the question, are Islam and Europe so very incompatible? Even areas of secular domestic policy, where the EU deems there is work to be done, have their contradictions.

Perhaps the principle stumbling block in this regard is Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which upholds the Kemalist nationalist policy making the derogation of Turkishness a punishable offence. This law led famously to the summoning of the Nobel Prize winning Turkish author Orhan Pamuk before the courts in 2005 for discussing the Armenian genocide, an event the government rigorously denies to this day. Such a law, the men in Brussels say, is contradictory to the European value of freedom of speech.

Yet as many Turkish politicians have repeatedly pointed out, to overturn this law would require the direct intervention of the executive in matters pertaining to the remit of the judiciary, thus curtailing judicial independence which is itself seen as a cornerstone of Western democratic principles. Even if the offending article was to be abolished, and there has been talk that it might, the question of the Armenian genocide itself would remain another controversial sticking point. In 2005 The European Assembly voted by 356 to 181 calling on Turkey “to recognize the Genocide of the Armenians,” stating further that this was a “prerequisite to accession to the European Union.” This followed a unanimous vote by the French Assembly in 2001 officially labelling the events of 1915-17 as Genocide. Perhaps concerned that a refusal to accept the existence of a genocide by the government was symptomatic of a wider issue of Turkish reluctance to treat its ethnic minorities on an equal footing with the rest of the population, the bill nonetheless provoked uproar in the Turkish media and a consequent outbreak of anti-EU sentiment in the country as a whole.

It is probably fair to say that the Assembly bill calling for compulsory recognition of the genocide is one of those examples of bad laws for a good cause, because there can be little question that real work remains to be done in Turkey to improve the rights and representation of its ethnic minorities, of whom the Armenians are just one. The other principle group in question are the Kurds, who comprise approximately 15-20 per cent of the population, but whom the state refuses to recognise as a separate ethnic group. Feelings of national unity run high on the political agenda, and threats to the wholeness and integrity of the Turkish state are keenly felt; Kurdish nationalist feelings, whether expressed politically or through violent means, are continually being combated. The majority of the Kurdish population live in the economically underdeveloped southeast of the country, and for decades there has existed there a ‘state of emergency’ in which Turkish forces have combated the Kurdish militant organisation the PKK, who fight for an independent Kurdish state.

In recent weeks, fighting between the two sides has flared up again, with PKK attacks on Turkish positions and convoys leading to dozens being killed on both sides, and, worryingly, Turkish counter-incursions into northern Iraq to strike what they claim are PKK training camps in the area. Over the years estimates for numbers killed on both sides range from 25-35,000, and this continuous state of hostility has undoubtedly led to government reservations about granting greater rights to a minority who count amongst them a great many who wish to be rid of the Turkish state all together.

But in fact, Turkey is really its own worst enemy in this regard. It can be argued with good reason that it is precisely because the state affords its Kurdish population such limited rights that so many wish to be rid of it. High levels of poverty and unemployment in the southeast, running at up to 50 per cent in some areas, provide the PKK with fertile recruiting ground. At present, Kurdish education is provided through only a few private local courses and television in Kurdish is for just half-an-hour each week under the monopoly of the state-broadcasting corporation TRT. Though Turkish authorities recently recognised the Kurdish language, many regard this as a cosmetic operation. Perhaps more could and would be done if there were greater political representation of Kurds on both a regional and a national level. One significant step in this regard would be the relinquishing, or at least reduction of the ten percent threshold required to win a seat in the Turkish Parliament, and indeed there have been calls from within the European Union for this to be done. The government line is that this threshold is necessary for political stability as it prevents radical minorities from winning representation.

Clearly then, the situation is far from ideal, but inviting Turkey to join the party has the potential to solve as many problems as it poses. Traditionally, the EU’s strongest foreign policy weapon has been carrot as opposed to stick diplomacy. The EU sees itself as a bastion of human rights, democratic government and fair play that the rest of the world would do well to follow. Though not inconsiderable problems still exist in the newly admitted countries from Eastern Europe, all of these states have implemented reforms in their social, legal and political systems that would have been improbable without the incentive of EU membership.

So it is with Turkey, and pulling up the drawbridge to fortress Europe is hardly likely to result in Turkey jumping to address its problems which, at present, obstruct it attaining full membership. Even the kind of ‘privileged partnership’ preferred as an alternative to full membership by a number of more hostile EU states, is unlikely to have the desired reforming effect within Turkey. Indeed, it may be seen as a patronising alternative that Turkey would feel unable to accept. In fact, increased awareness of European hostility to the idea of Turkish membership has already led to many within the country to question the merits of joining at all. A Eurobarometer survey in 2006 showed that only 45 per cent of Turks support accession to the EU, fewer than in certain existing member-states, and just 35 per cent trust the EU. An outcome that sees a mutual rejection of Turkish membership on both sides would be in nobody’s best interests.

If Turkey were to be admitted to the Union, under present rules it would also receive the second highest number of seats in the EU Parliament after Germany, and analysts suggest that Turkey’s population could overtake Germany’s by 2015 if present trends continue, in turn giving it the largest number of seats. Such a prospect is worrying to more than just a few. However, given that the total European population stands at close to 500 million, it seems unlikely that the Turks could run amok without opposition.

But why is the prospect of a politically strong Turkey in the Parliament so very worrying anyway? One might just as easily ask why Austria, with 18 MEPs at present, does not voice greater concerns about Germany’s overwhelming 99. Concerns of this nature seem to be rooted in cultural prejudice, a belief, even if it is not always spoken, that to give the heir to the Ottoman Empire (with cultural values seemingly so very different to those of old Europe) such influence would be dangerous if not catastrophic. In fact the reverse is probably true: to hold such opinions and to make it known that they are held is the more dangerous alternative. There can be no question that since the events of 11 September 2001 the world has changed, and that the world’s perception of Muslims have, in turn, changed with it. Many in Europe believe that the bombings in Madrid in 2004 were the consequence of the Aznar government’s support for the Iraq war of 2003, and similarly the 7/7 bombings in London – and more recently the failed attempts in Glasgow and London again earlier this year – the result of the United Kingdom’s involvement. The EU has been called a ‘Christian Club’ before, yet it is a club with significant proportions of Muslim and, indeed, Turks living in it too, the latter alone numbering some 3.8 million at present.

The riots in the suburbs of Paris and elsewhere in France in October and November of 2005 were partly provoked by a sense of alienation and non-acceptance amongst the Muslim population, and if Europe is really to be the lighthouse of freedom and acceptance that it rightly aspires to be, then these are issues that need to be addressed. Admitting Turkey to the Union may well prove to be part of the solution. Rejecting it could just as easily add to the problem. Far from being a negative, it is precisely because Turkey’s population is overwhelmingly Muslim that the EU should be seeking to integrate it as a member, provided Turkey’s commitment to secular democracy can be upheld. To refuse Turkey membership to the EU, particularly if it does implement the reforms required of it, would send a message to Europe’s Muslims that they are not themselves fully welcome here. How could it be otherwise if the powers that be do not wish for Turkey to be a member on the grounds of its different cultural heritage? It would not be unexpected to see greater problems with the integration of Europe’s Muslims should the Turkish application be thus rejected.

Turkish membership also has significant foreign policy implications, particularly in the Middle East. With Turkey part of the club, there is the very real prospect of the EU becoming the most important world player in Middle Eastern politics. There can be little doubt that the United States has lost both influence and credibility in the region following the bungled follow-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003, a fact epitomised by the increasingly gung-ho attitude of the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran towards the outside world, and the US in particular.

Russia, traditionally another big player, loses credibility thanks to its persistent support of Serbia over the question of independence for Kosovo, with Albanian Muslims making up 90 per cent of the latter’s population, the continued persecution of its own Muslim citizens in Chechnya (undoubtedly Russian opposition to Kosovan independence stems from concerns of setting a precedent given the Chechnyans' own fight for the same thing), and of course the legacy of its invasion of Afghanistan in 1980.

At present China seems uninterested in meddling in matters political, instead pursuing a foreign policy of live-and-let-buy, evidenced most strikingly by its policy of non-interference in Sudan whilst continuing to buy oil and trade there. The EU by contrast still enjoys some credibility in the Middle East, owing to the opposition of France and Germany to the Iraq War, despite the actions of the UK and others who followed the US into battle. Admitting Turkey to the Union could only help matters in this regard. Portugal’s Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral had good reason when he asserted in October 2005 that “the agreement to start talks with Turkey will probably displease Mr Osama bin Laden, who has done everything to prevent this moment arriving.” Not only is Turkey a Muslim country, albeit majority Sunni in contrast to Shia Iran and Iraq, but it shares borders with both of those countries, as well as Syria.

Turkish membership would also send a clear message to the Middle East that Europe was not merely a ‘Christian Club,’ though it is hardly such a thing anyway. Rather, it could grow to be seen as a body genuinely empathetic towards the Muslim world, and capable of credibly assisting in solving its problems. Given that this is the case, and given the centrality of the Middle East in world politics in recent years, it must be concluded that far from asking whether Europe can afford to accept Turkey into the Union, it must instead be asked that, if the EU is serious about playing with the big boys in matters pertaining to political foreign policy, how can it really afford not to?