Somalian piracy: Chaos on the high seas

In the 21st century, the word “piracy” evokes cheap, illegal DVDs of Hollywood blockbusters, not robbery on the high seas. But old-fashioned “Jolly Roger” style piracy is back. Off the eastern coast of Africa, this menace is apparent on a daily basis, as demonstrated by the seizure of the 330-metre Sirius Star on 16 November, with its cargo of oil worth nearly $100m. Given the threat posed by piracy to trade and prosperity it was perhaps surprising that it took 83 acknowledged attacks—33 successful enough to command a ransom—to create the political will necessary to launch a campaign against the pirates.

The pressure to tackle piracy off Somalia’s coast is growing by the day. The threat to commercial shipping in the region is now greater than it has been for decades. On November 20, the United Nations Security Council unanimously imposed fresh sanctions on Somalia. These sanctions come on the back of a commitment by the European Union to launch a naval operation in the Gulf of Aden led by Britain.

International action is certainly welcome and the EU mission is significant as the first naval operation conducted under the auspices of the EU’s security and defence policy (ESDP). Although the financial costs of the operation—estimated at €8.3 million per year—are relatively small, the effect on the EU’s self-image could be significant. The French defence minister, Herve Morin, sees the operation as “proof that a Europe of defence is starting to take shape.”

There is a desperate need to protect vessels of the UN World Food Programme that deliver food aid to displaced people in Somalia. Furthermore, the broader threat to international trade is clear. Roughly ten per cent of world trade and 11 per cent of world petroleum flows through these waters. A tough response is needed given that the pirates are well-armed, and bankrolled handsomely by Somalis in Dubai and elsewhere. Their motivation seems to be the ransoms that companies are willing to pay to secure the release of their seized ships, cargoes, and crew. Thus far around 500 crew members have been taken hostage and an estimated $30 million paid in ransom. But a naval mission can do more than tackle a sea-based symptom of a land-based problem.

There are some positive signs. At last week's Security Council meeting, the most senior diplomat of the African Union called for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Somalia. NATO military chiefs meeting in Brussels last week, indicated that a coordinated worldwide response is required and put forward a plethora of proposals. Russia has suggested land operations against Somali pirate bases. But the prospect of a well-equipped international force being deployed inside Somalia still seems a distant one. With the UN unable to produce half of its promised force for Darfur, despite a detailed plan for one, Somalia stands little chance of getting any blue helmets.

But it desperately needs them. Somalia has lacked a government, in effect, since 1991 and the state is currently governed by the fourteenth interim administration in 17 years. This is not the way that politics are supposed to be organized within states. International relations scholars often differentiate domestic politics from international politics by their structures. In domestic systems, there are governmental institutions that establish law and order. The international system is characterized as anarchic because there is no higher authority to protect states from external aggression. But this dichotomy is not always appropriate. States are sometimes weak and unable to provide even the most basic security to their populations. In this environment, domestic politics begin to resemble international politics and piracy is just one of many possible outcomes.

For six months during 2006, the Islamic Courts Union controlled most of southern and central Somalia. They brought something resembling order for the first time since the early 1990s and piracy all but disappeared. It began to flourish again after Ethiopian troops—with the implicit backing of the United States—invaded and ousted the Islamists. The international community should draw the obvious lesson from this.

Hopefully, in the months ahead, the UN will find a way to work closely with the African Union and the EU to bring some semblance of domestic order to Somalia. If the moral duty to assist displaced Somalis is not compelling enough, then perhaps western governments will now realize that an unsettled Somalia can cause a lot of trouble—on land and at sea—and act out of good, old-fashioned self interest. Without some form of action, Somalia is destined to remain a bloody kaleidoscope of competing clans, a launching pad for piracy, and the world's most utterly failed state.