The US-led Pak-Afghan Disaster

A recent terrorist attack on the Pakistan army headquarters (GHQ) is another manifestation of the fragile peace and security in the country, as well as having broader implications on the region as a whole. Peace in Pakistan is not an internal issue but inextricably bound to Afghanistan where NATO forces are currently attempting to bomb the Taliban and al-Qaeda into oblivion.

Pakistan’s stability has been gravely undermined by the twin blowback from Afghanistan: firstly, the war against the Soviet occupation and secondly, the consequences of the 2001 US military intervention. Pacifying Afghanistan is a difficult job considering that resistance against US-led western forces has only intensified since October 2001 when America ousted the Taliban from power and installed a US-friendly government headed by Hamid Karzai. NATO and Afghan government forces' inability to inflict a military defeat on the Taliban, and the resilience of the latter, means the current situation is hardly surprising.

The raison d'etre for the American invasion of Afghanistan is to terminate any threat they might pose to world peace. However, Afghanistan must be seen as a regional issue with all neighbouring countries involved. The US have been looking at the situation too specifically, resulting in the spill-over of the Taliban into Pakistan.

US-led armies in Afghanistan and the Pakistan army in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) are now committed to fight militants operating on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. However, there seems to be a lack of coordination between the US and Pakistan security forces. The American administration blames the Pakistan army for its links with the Taliban, and the Pakistan army accuses the US army of responding with much dithering and delay.

At the same time there have been numerous writings by American intelligentsia against the Pakistan army and government. US intelligence agencies claim that Musharraf was playing a double game: on the one hand assuring the Americans that he was “with them” in their fight against the Taliban and on the other, backing the terrorist insurgents. Musharraf’s record of duplicity is not a secret and Washington's support of the dictator (contrary to their promotion of democracy) leaves us to wonder whether Musharraf’s political deviance was his own statecraft, American connivance or American naivety.

The situation is further complicated by the possibility of a proxy war between Pakistan and India on Afghan soil. David Singer in his book The Inheritance argues that “the real problem for the Pakistan army in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan is not al-Qaeda or the Taliban, or even militants trying to topple the Pakistani government. The real problem is Pakistan’s rival [India]”. Mr Karzai’s cosy relationship with India for investment and aid is no secret. According to Mr Singer, Pakistan is attempting to keep the India-Afghan relationship in check by supporting the Taliban. There are fourteen Indian consulates in Afghanistan—it is unclear as to why such excess is necessary. It is alleged that Indian consulates are routinely involved in the the supply of money, weapons and training camps to support terrorists so that they might carry out subversive activities in Pakistan. These complexities seem to have gone amiss in Washington.

Beyond that, al-Qaeda appear to be regrouping in Pakistan. According to an American intelligence assessment report of July 2007, al-Qaeda is sheltered in Pakistan and has “reorganised its command structure and is once again planning attacks against the United States”. The Americans seem convinced that the next big attack against them is to be launched from FATA. Such a worry is not negligible. Pakistan is a place of concern in terms of the threat posed to US security, as well as a threat to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan.

The fragile situation raises concerns over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and the fear that these might fall into the wrong hands. These fears were recently dispelled by Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who stated that “Pakistan faces a serious threat from terrorism, but the country's nuclear arsenal is not at risk”. I myself made enquiries on this matter, and was informed by a high-level Pakistani official that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are under a very effective command and control system. The security is based on a chain of strong multi-layered, institutionalised systems with administrative and command and control structures. US media hype over Pakistan's nuclear weapons is largely unfounded.

As far as nuclear arms are concerned, the truly alarming facts are those surrounding Iran’s over-ambitious nuclear program. If Iran gets hold of them, it might tip the middle east into a nuclear arms race, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia following suit. All three will not only be a threat to each other but a triple threat to the state of Israel, in which case one can only expect drastic measures by the Israelis to compensate. The entire region will be transformed into a gun-powder magazine just waiting for a spark. It is this region that really needs global attention, in cooperation with regional actors, in order to eradicate extremism and terrorism - but, contrary to popular belief, this is an entirely different matter.

The US can certainly not leave Afghanistan as things stand. The repetition of the strategic error in the 1990s to leave Afghanistan without a “Marshall Plan” equivalent would only generate further chaos. However, sending more troops to Afghanistan will have numerous negative bearings upon the region: a possible influx of more militants from across the border into Pakistan, refugees fleeing intensified fighting, an increased vulnerability of US-NATO ground supply routes, violent reprisals in mainland Pakistan, and a taxation of the Pakistan army beyond their capabilities, not to mention the vast civilian casualties that are ultimately inevitable.

The policy of military extension must be reviewed. Mr Obama as the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize is in a sticky predicament; the proliferation of war is not entirely in sync with a peace prize. A third way must be found. Its main thrust should be to pursue a political solution aimed at separating elements of the Taliban from al-Qaeda and drawing all Afghan groups into a process of reconciliation. This requires a political framework within which serious negotiations can be pursued and meaningful incentives are offered to insurgents. Talks, initially through intermediaries, with those Taliban elements that are ready to disavow al-Qaeda and abandon violence should be undertaken, and terms set out in exchange for a progressive withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan. If an agreement can be arrived at and backed by a regional consensus, a UN/OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) peace-keeping force drawn from Muslim countries can be inducted to implement such an accord.

The failed US policy needs a structural overhaul. There is a dire need to adopt a regional strategy to resolve the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Treating Pakistan and Afghanistan as separate policy countries is a mistake. Additionally, there must be checks on regional countries who are fueling terrorism for their own interests. Finally, it is significant that the success Pakistan has had recently in countering militancy in the Swat district was partly because of public support. Americans have to muster some modicum of popularity in Pakistan and Afghanistan before waging any more war strategies: this is not a battle to be fought with bombs, but a battle of winning hearts and minds. Let's hope the the Americans are up to it.