The role of the US military in the international relief effort in Haiti has come under increasing flak in the three weeks following the catastrophic earthquake. The leaders of Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela have portrayed the US military presence as occupational, a criticism which resonates with those of the French Cooperation Minister Alain Joyandet. The Italian civil protection chief has called the operation "pathetic" and the NGO Medecins Sans Frontières, has accused the US military of diverting their planes carrying emergency medical supplies to the Dominican Republic. Are these allegations valid?
Some certainly are. The bottlenecks at the airstrips of Port-au-Prince that prevented 85 tonnes of vital medical supplies from landing in the capital between January 14th and 19th are at best a logistical error, at worst a gross failure in prioritisation on behalf of the American military. The cargo of one rejected plane was an inflatable field hospital which would allow for MSF medical staff to treat more patients without the fear of the building collapsing during subsequent tremors. Here the criticism seems warranted.
Yet here too must it end, at least for now. If US military presence does not decrease in the longer term, then the accusation of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, that the US is "manipulating the tragedy to install North American troops in Haiti" may be proved right. However, to portray the military’s "operation unified response" as an occupational effort after so short a period of time is to ignore the context of their intervention in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.
On 12 January, Haiti was left without any useable infrastructure, and without someone to coordinate the incongruent aid groups that immediately offered their assistance. Although the reconstruction conference held in Montreal last week no doubt concluded correctly that the Haitian government should play a leading role in the restoration of their country, this was not a possibility three weeks ago. All government buildings were destroyed, and President Préval vanished into the woodwork for a week before holding his first news conference. The government is still operating out of a police station by the airport.
The United Nations was equally ill equipped to direct relief efforts. Amongst the large numbers of UN staff dead or unaccounted for, the head of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti, Hédi Annabi and his deputy, Luis Carlos da Costa, were both killed in the collapse of the Christopher Hotel, the UN headquarters in Port au Prince. Before the catastrophe, the Brazilian peacekeepers on Haiti were a security force, ill-equipped to lead humanitarian efforts. The US military fills this vacuum. Although Italy’s civil protection chief Guido Bertolaso’s proposal for an international humanitarian coordinator should be welcomed, it comes almost two weeks too late.
Such extensive criticism also disregards the blatant need for a military force in the immediate aftermath of such a disaster. Which other organization can mobilize more than 10,000 personnel in both rescue and distribution operations within so short a period? The rapid assessment and rehabilitation of Haiti’s airports to receive aid and the mobilisation of US hovercraft to bring supplies to shore despite the country’s ruined harbours have been vital for the relief effort to this point. Planes could not land, nor would they be able to transport their cargo to those in need from the runway without US repair crews and transport vehicles. The USS Carl Vinson, anchored off the Haitian coast, desalinates 400,000 gallons of fresh water a day. An Unmanned Global Hawk drone has mapped the island to better direct the delivery of emergency supplies. The hospital ship the USNS Comfort provides the most advanced medical care available for the worst injured quake victims.
The aid effort thus far has cleary been fraught with some difficulty. But after three weeks, allegations that the US fosters occupational plans for Haiti appear both misconstrued and unappreciative of the US military effort.