Death of a terrorist

As The Journal went to press, we heard the news of a dawn raid in Pakistan that resulted in the death of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden at the hands of American soldiers. In a stern White House press conference early on Monday morning, President Barack Obama announced the news to a stunned world, and in the streets of several American cities, hundreds gathered for spontaneous celebrations. It was, we are told, justice served upon a monster; a blow struck that would dent Al-Qaeda's ability to continue its campaign of terror. A little later on, from behind a thin facade of stoic statesmanship we saw British prime minister David Cameron and foreign secretary William Hague hail the operation as a great victory over the spectre of Al-Qaeda.

Let us be clear: Mr bin Laden was a terrorist directly responsible for unspeakable atrocities – not least the awful events of 11 September 2001 which have defined the geopolitical course of the last decade – but the glee with which many have greeted the news of his demise is nauseating.

It cannot be denied that the events of 9/11 loom large in the American national consciousness: how could they not, when 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered in the most terrifying attack ever carried out on US soil? There is, perhaps understandably, a sense that its architect's death brings with it some sort of symbolic closure for those affected by the attacks. But the political back-slapping and vengeful joy that have consumed much of the Western world are disgraceful for two reasons: first, because it is inhuman to take such pleasure in war, and second, because it is potentially fatally naïve.

Mr bin Laden's death is a small victory in the poorly-monikered 'War on Terror'. Al-Qaeda and jihadist groups like it will not be silenced by one death, no matter how senior – did the assassinations of Baitullah Masood or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi put a stop to the bloody insurgencies and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq? To imagine for even a moment that it might leaves us open to an unthinkable shock.

Al-Qaeda, as any political scientist will tell you, is not a state, or even a particularly cohesive group. It cannot be fought like one. It is, instead, what is termed a 'transnational network': its operations are carried out by small cells that operate almost entirely autonomously, and its leaders are, at most, figureheads responsible for strategy only at a very abstract level. Mr bin Laden himself has not been 'in command' in any operational sense for years.

World governments should take care not to make too much of this 'victory': a perception of the West as entirely fixated on revenge will only serve to further alienate us from the Islamic world at a time when we desperately need a constructive dialogue rather than heavy-handed bloodletting or fear-mongering rhetoric about 'radicalisation'. A little more respect for human life and a little less time spent gulling the Western public into more mindless fear could go a long way.