Few of the political pundits put odds on Annapolis being anything more than a hackneyed photo-opportunity, and sadly, it seems they were not disappointed. Days of negotiations between the greying, middle-aged protagonists—this time in the guise of the Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas—produced nothing more than a "commitment" to a two-state solution and an agreement to restart negotiations. None of the major issues at present standing in the way of peace were addressed, namely the final status of Jerusalem, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, the future of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the Security Fence, and of course Hamas.

On one level this is unsurprising. On another, it is quite astonishing. It is unsurprising because, if the history of the last 60 years has taught the world anything, it is that a satisfactory resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is quite impossible if the principle actors are left to hammer it out on their own. Old quarrels and personal resentments have cut too deep to enable either side to make the compromises and conciliations necessary to bring about a lasting peace without considerable outside pressure and mediation. And left to their own they have more or less been under the Bush administration, though the fact this photo-summit was called at all, and with such an impressive brigade of Arab leaders too, shows that this is, perhaps, beginning to change.

And about time too. It is not only in the best interests of the Israelis and the Palestinians that every sinew is bent towards the peaceful creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel but it is also in the interests of the United States. America professes a desire to see peace in the Middle East and yet her rabidly pro-Israeli stance—Colin Powell pertinently commented in 2003 that many Americans were "more Likudnic than Likud"—fatally obstructs the realisation of this goal.

Take Syria as an example, with borders on Iraq and Israel, and links with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran. It is a crucial player in the region, yet in 2001 it was put on George Bush’s "Axis of Evil." What incentive does Syria have to stem the flow of militants and arms across its border into Iraq, to co-operate with the International Community in bringing Iran’s nuclear programme into check, and to co-operate in the "war on terror" more generally, when it feels so reviled by the West, and whilst America fails to put pressure on Israel to return the Golan Heights? In short, not much. Even states where the political leadership professes solidarity with the United States have significant proportions of the populace of a very contrary view thanks to America’s unbalanced support for Israel. Saudi Arabia is one good example, as of course is Iraq itself, a country in which the official position and the reality on the ground could not be more violently divergent.

Yet if only the US were to be seen to acting positively towards a Palestinian solution then American relations with the Muslim world would be transformed. Furthermore, it can be done. Today is not the world of 20 years ago: Fatah, the principle Palestinian political party, recognises Israel’s right to exist, and Israel recognises Fatah, (though not Hamas) as a legitimate partner with whom it can negotiate. The world seems to forget how close the two sides came to a settlement under the negotiations initiated by Mr Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton, at Camp David in 2000, followed by the Summit of 21-27 January 2001 in the Egyptian resort of Taba. Unfortunately, the inauguration of George Bush on 20 January heralded in a regime singularly uncommitted to the process, and with the replacement of Ehud Barak by Ariel Sharon on 6 February, the already faltering negotiations collapsed when the latter refused to meet with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Accusations flew in both directions, with Barak, and then Sharon accusing the Palestinians of insufficient compromise. The sentiment, of course, was reciprocated. Despite this, the words of the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat following the summit say much: "my heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."

Lest one be in any doubt as to how close to a settlement the process was, it is worth bearing in mind that the EU had - ready to go - an aid package of no less than $20 billion to be used upon conclusion of the settlement. Both sides agreed that they had “never been closer” to reaching an agreement and pledged to resume talks following the Israeli election. In a sense, the Road Map of 2003 based on the Taba principles was an attempt at just that: following the Arab Peace Initiative of the preceding year the Road Map pledged the Arab League’s support of the process, and promised a “normalisation of relations with Israel” should a solution be achieved. But the Bush administration never entered into the talks with the commitment necessary to bridge the gaps between the two sides and achieve the necessary levels of compromise.

The whole project was fatally derailed by the diversion of American attention following the bungling of the Iraq invasion. Now, however, with Iraq in chaos, Iran more dangerous and truculent than ever, and continuing instability in Lebanon, the United States needs more than ever the support of the Arab states if it wants to achieve its goals in the region. In part, the effort to include these states at Annapolis, notably including Syria, was evidence that at long last the US is starting to realise this, as well as the centrality of the Palestinian question in this context. But Annapolis was no way like enough, and nor it seems did George Bush try to make it so.

If the US wants to get serious about peace and stability in the Middle East, then it is high time it got serious about Palestine. With elections looming next year, perhaps it is too late for the Bush presidency, but it does not bode well that every single one of the presidential candidates for 2008 has pledged their "unconditional support" for Israel. It is no secret that the limit of a politician's altruism usually extends about as far as his or her self-interest will allow it to, but it is should be made very clear that in the case of Palestine both self-interest and altruism share a common goal. Be it for the sake of furthering progress in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran or just for the sake of the Israelis and Palestinians themselves, a renewed effort to resolve the Palestinian question—and that means going much further than Annapolis—is in everyone’s best interests.